

REGULATING MARKET POWER AND BIG TECH ON THE TWO SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC

Thomas Philippon


NYU, NBER, CEPR

Torino, May 2024


Motivation

- EU has improved its competition policy
 - Lower prices than in the US
- But what about productivity?
 - Mixed
- And what about Tech?
 - From GAFAM to AI, difficult to regulate

An Example of Good Concentration: Walmart




An Example of Bad Concentration: Telecom



Cost of Internet Access, 2018

Rank	Country	Broadband Cost
40	France	\$ 31
43	South Korea	\$ 32
53	Germany	\$ 37
...		
119	US	\$ 68


Decreasing Turnover (1/2)




Technology or Policy

Europe?

Product Market Reforms in Europe




Comparison of Telecom Prices in FR vs US



Gutiérrez and Philippon (2018)

Regulation: US vs EU




The Missing Trillion Dollar


Estimated loss from excessive market power in the US

- Monthly savings per households: \$300
- Nationwide annual household direct savings: \$600 billion
- General equilibrium impact of returning to competitive markets
 - GDP: \$1 trillion
 - Labor Income: \$1.25 trillion, profits: -\$250 billion

EU-EA/US GDP per Capita at PPP




GDP per Capita at PPP




GDP per Capita: Beware of PPP

GDP per capita / US, PPP vs EXC




GDP per Capita: Beware of PPP, FRA

FRA GDP per capita / US, PPP vs EXC



TFP: Catch-Up and Slowdown



EU Catch-Up and Slowdown

Table: TFP Increments


$\Delta[TFP]/TFP_{US,1947}$	1947-1990	1991-2019
USA	.023	.027
Euro Area	.037	.016
Japan	.029	.012
Denmark	.026	.026
Sweden	.022	.028

Notes: TFP Increments measured in units of US TFP in 1947.


About the Stars

How Do Current Stars Compare
to those of the Past?


Footprint of Global Stars



Winner Takes All?



Productivity?



Notes: Excludes Oil industries

(Misconceptions about) “Star” Firms

- Star firms scale with world GDP
 - Foreign sales bias Domar weights
- “Winner-takes-all” effect does not seem to have increased
- Productivity growth not as high as in the past
- High profit margin and valuation mostly due to lower taxes and lower costs (global sourcing)

New New Stars

- Phase 1 (time to 1M users)
 - Google. 1998. 1M in 1 year
- Phase 2 (time to 100M users)
 - Facebook. 2004 + 4 years
 - Twitter. 2006 + 6 years
 - Spotify: 2008 + 8 years
 - Instagram: 2010 + 2.5 years
 - Uber: 2010 (or 2009) + 6 years
 - Snapchat: 2011 + 3 years
- Phase 3 (time to 100M users)
 - TikTok: 2016 + 9 months
 - Chat GPT: 2022 + 2 months


Regulating Tech Sector

- Antitrust ill-equipped to deal with global market power and with the speed of new technologies/platforms
- Current actions are useful but too late, and probably too small
 - Impact of antitrust on values is all but invisible
- And cost of regulation is real
 - GDPR
 - AI

Data & GDPR

GDPR and Data Storage by EU Firms

Change in data storage



Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Source: Researchers' calculations using cloud computing data.


Conclusion

- EU competition policy mostly a success
- Lack of impact on productivity
 - Energy prices
- Tech regulation is balancing act
 - GDPR: OK, but need review
 - AI: too much regulation

Concentration can be Good or Bad

- Good concentration
 - low prices, high productivity, intangible investment
 - e.g, retail & wholesale trade
- Bad concentration
 - high prices and low productivity
 - e.g., telecoms, airlines, healthcare


Failure of Free Entry



Elasticity of Number of Firms to Q Across U.S. Industries. Gutiérrez and Philippon (2019)

The Rise in US Concentration


Panel A. Cumulative Change in CR8 (%)



Source: U.S. Economic Census for all Businesses. Dashed lines because of changes in industry classification from SIC to NAICS.


US VS EU Concentration

Figure 9. Concentration for Manufacturing vs Services in Europe & North America




Source: OECD. Bajgar et al. (2019)

Fading Stars




Increasing Entrenchment (2/2)



GDP per Capita: Beware of PPP


Figure 2: GDP per capita at PPP (US=100), 1980-2028

■ EU27 ■ China ■ North EU ■ West EU ■ South EU ■ East EU



Source: Bruegel

Footprint of US Stars



References I

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Philippon, T. (2019). *The Great Reversal*. Harvard University Press.