When Migrants Mobilize Against Labor Exploitation: Evidence from the Italian Farmlands

Gemma Dipoppa,
Columbia University

Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano – Fondazione Collegio Carlo Alberto
Migration Observatory 9th Annual Conference

Immigrant Exploitation and Policy-Induced Uncertainty

Estimates on Undocumented Migrants

Unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S., in millions

3.5 — 5.7 — 8.6 — 11.1 — 12.2 — 11.4 — 11.0 — 10.2 — 10.5 — 11.0

1990   1995   2000   2005   2010   2015   2020   2022

Note: Shading shows the range of the estimated 90% confidence interval. The data points labeled are 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2007 (peak), 2010, 2015, 2019, 2021 and 2022.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on augmented U.S. Census Bureau data.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Germany

1,200 High estimate
1,000 Low estimate

600 — 1,200 — 1,400 —
500 — 600 — 1,100 —

2014   2015   2016   2017

United Kingdom

1,200 High estimate
800 Low estimate

1,200 — 1,200 — 1,300 —
900 — 800 — 900 —

2014   2015   2016   2017

Italy

700 High estimate
500 Low estimate

500 — 600 — 600 —
300 — 300 — 400 —

2014   2015   2016   2017

Motivation

- A large fraction of the migrant population is undocumented but we mostly have research on the integration of legal migrants and refugees.

  (e.g., Clemens, 2011; Dancygier and Laitin, 2014).

Motivation

- A large fraction of the migrant population is undocumented but we mostly have research on the integration of legal migrants and refugees.

  (e.g., Clemens, 2011; Dancygier and Laitin, 2014).

- Existing studies on undocumented migrants are based on when migrants stop being undocumented.

  - Impact of regularization policies

    (Pinotti, 2017; Fasani, 2018; Comino et al., 2020; Bahar et al, 2021)

  - Impact of sanctuary cities

    (Hainmueller et al., 2017; Swartz et al., 2019; Hausman, 2020)

Motivation

- A large fraction of the migrant population is undocumented but we mostly have research on the integration of legal migrants and refugees.

  (e.g., Clemens, 2011; Dancygier and Laitin, 2014).

- Existing studies on undocumented migrants are based on when migrants stop being undocumented.
  - Impact of regularization policies

    (Pinotti, 2017; Fasani, 2018; Comino et al., 2020; Bahar et al, 2021)
  - Impact of sanctuary cities

    (Hainmueller et al., 2017; Swartz et al., 2019; Hausman, 2020)

- Lack of evidence on how to improve migrants' integration while they are undocumented.

Motivation

- When undocumented, migrants are at high risk of labor exploitation.

Motivation

- When undocumented, migrants are at high risk of labor exploitation.

- 27 million people worldwide are victims of forced labor (ILO, 2022).
  - Any service extracted under threat of penalty - from violence to debt bondage and retention of identity documents.

Motivation

- When undocumented, migrants are at high risk of labor exploitation.

- 27 million people worldwide are victims of forced labor (ILO, 2022).
  - Any service extracted under threat of penalty - from violence to debt bondage and retention of identity documents.
  - Often involves criminal intermediaries, who smuggle migrants, offer them sub-standard working conditions, and prevent from reporting under threat of retaliation.

Motivation

- When undocumented, migrants are at high risk of labor exploitation.

- 27 million people worldwide are victims of forced labor (ILO, 2022).
  - Any service extracted under threat of penalty - from violence to debt bondage and retention of identity documents.
  - Often involves criminal intermediaries, who smuggle migrants, offer them sub-standard working conditions, and prevent from reporting under threat of retaliation.

- Prevalent in advanced economies (ILO, 2022).

Motivation

- Problems arising from migrant labor exploitation:
    - Human rights violation.

Motivation

- Problems arising from migrant labor exploitation:
  - Human rights violation.
  - Loss in state capacity – missed fiscal revenues and control on informal labor.

Motivation

- Problems arising from migrant labor exploitation:
  - Human rights violation.
  - Loss in state capacity – missed fiscal revenues and control on informal labor.
  - Change labor markets, competitive edge to firms hiring illegally.

Motivation

- Problems arising from migrant labor exploitation:
  - Human rights violation.
  - Loss in state capacity – missed fiscal revenues and control on informal labor.
  - Change labor markets, competitive edge to firms hiring illegally.
  - When migrants are smuggled and under criminal control, they reinforce organized crime (Dipoppa, 2025).

Motivation

- Problems arising from migrant labor exploitation:
  - Human rights violation.
  - Loss in state capacity – missed fiscal revenues and control on informal labor.
  - Change labor markets, competitive edge to firms hiring illegally.
  - When migrants are smuggled and under criminal control, they reinforce organized crime (Dipoppa, 2025).

- Nonetheless, limited understanding of how to fight against labor exploitation.

Motivation

- Problems arising from migrant labor exploitation:
    - Human rights violation.
    - Loss in state capacity – missed fiscal revenues and control on informal labor.
    - Change labor markets, competitive edge to firms hiring illegally.
    - When migrants are smuggled and under criminal control, they reinforce organized crime (Dipoppa, 2025).

- Nonetheless, limited understanding of how to fight against labor exploitation.

$\rightarrow$ Difficulty: hard to crack downs on exploitative labor if migrants do not report those exploiting them.

Research Question

Under what conditions is it possible to crack down on migrant labor exploitation?

Research Question

Under what conditions is it possible to crack down on migrant labor exploitation?
Are there interventions that can effectively lead migrants to report?

Research Question

Under what conditions is it possible to crack down on migrant labor exploitation? Are there interventions that can effectively lead migrants to report?

Reasons for pessimism: high costs from reporting

- Undocumented workers who decide to speak up against labor exploitation might lose their job,

Research Question

Under what conditions is it possible to crack down on migrant labor exploitation?
Are there interventions that can effectively lead migrants to report?

Reasons for pessimism: high costs from reporting

- Undocumented workers who decide to speak up against labor exploitation might lose their job,

- Have low chances of future employment in the same location,

Research Question

Under what conditions is it possible to crack down on migrant labor exploitation? Are there interventions that can effectively lead migrants to report?

Reasons for pessimism: high costs from reporting

- Undocumented workers who decide to speak up against labor exploitation might lose their job,
- Have low chances of future employment in the same location,
- They risk deportation if they are not put under state protection,

Research Question

Under what conditions is it possible to crack down on migrant labor exploitation?
Are there interventions that can effectively lead migrants to report?

Reasons for pessimism: high costs from reporting

- Undocumented workers who decide to speak up against labor exploitation might lose their job,

- Have low chances of future employment in the same location,

- They risk deportation if they are not put under state protection,

- If they are under criminal control, they risk organized crime retaliation against themselves and their networks.

Research Question

Under what conditions is it possible to crack down on migrant labor exploitation?
Are there interventions that can effectively lead migrants to denounce?

On the other hand:

- Remaining in conditions of exploitation can also be dangerous: high rate of work related accidents, low quality of life.

Research Question

Under what conditions is it possible to crack down on migrant labor exploitation? Are there interventions that can effectively lead migrants to denounce?

On the other hand:

- Remaining in conditions of exploitation can also be dangerous: high rate of work related accidents, low quality of life.
- Mitigating the risks of reporting might change the balance in favor of speaking up.

In this paper

Evaluate a new type of multi-dimensional intervention fighting against migrant labor exploitation in Italy.

In this paper

Evaluate a new type of multi-dimensional intervention fighting against migrant labor exploitation in Italy.

- Union-led campaign of in-person canvassing to reach migrants working in agriculture.

In this paper

Evaluate a new type of multi-dimensional intervention fighting against migrant labor exploitation in Italy.

- Union-led campaign of in-person canvassing to reach migrants working in agriculture.
- Effects on **(1)** reporting of labor exploitation **(2)** organized crime prosecution, and **(3)** natives' reaction.

1. Context and intervention
2. Effects on labor racketeering news
3. Effects on organized crime prosecution
4. Effects on natives' reaction

Migrant labor racketeering

- Illegal recruitment and control of migrants.

- Often relies on organized crime intermediation.
  - Migrants' smuggling.
  - Enforcement of informal labor contracts with threats of retaliation.

- Not only in agriculture and not only in Italy.
  - E.g. Mexican migrants in agriculture in California.
  - E.g., Organized crime-controlled labor racketeering in services and constructions in the Arab Gulf countries.

Migrant exploitation in agriculture in Italy

CONDIZIONI DI VITA DEI MIGRANTI STAGIONALI

- **62%** non ha i servizi essenziali
- **64%** non ha l'acqua corrente
- **72%** dopo la raccolta presenta malattie di cui prima non soffriva

FONTE: QUARTO RAPPORTO AGROMAFIE E CAPORALATO
OSSERVATORIO PLACIDO RIZZOTTO FLAI-CGIL - LUGLIO 2018

From reports of Ngos and institutions (Eurispes, Placido Rizzotto):

4th Report on Labor Racketeering,

Placido Rizzotto Observatory

Migrant exploitation in agriculture in Italy

CONDIZIONI DI VITA DEI MIGRANTI STAGIONALI

62% non ha i servizi essenziali

64% non ha l'acqua corrente

72% dopo la raccolta presenta malattie di cui prima non soffriva

FONTE: QUARTO RAPPORTO AGROMAFIE E CAPORALATO
OSSERVATORIO PLACIDO RIZZOTTO FLAI-CGIL - LUGLIO 2018

4th Report on Labor Racketeering,

Placido Rizzotto Observatory

From reports of Ngos and institutions (Eurispes, Placido Rizzotto):

- 400,000 workers (30% of agriculture).

Migrant exploitation in agriculture in Italy

CONDIZIONI DI VITA DEI MIGRANTI STAGIONALI

62% non ha i servizi essenziali

64% non ha l'acqua corrente

72% dopo la raccolta presenta malattie di cui prima non soffriva

FONTE: QUARTO RAPPORTO AGROMAFIE E CAPORALATO OSSERVATORIO PLACIDO RIZZOTTO FLAI-CGIL - LUGLIO 2018

4th Report on Labor Racketeering,

Placido Rizzotto Observatory

From reports of Ngos and institutions (Eurispes, Placido Rizzotto):

- 400,000 workers (30% of agriculture).
- Most work 12-14 hr per day for 1 euro/hr.

Migrant exploitation in agriculture in Italy

CONDIZIONI DI VITA DEI MIGRANTI STAGIONALI

62% non ha i servizi essenziali

64% non ha l'acqua corrente

72% dopo la raccolta presenta malattie di cui prima non soffriva

FONTE: QUARTO RAPPORTO AGROMAFIE E CAPORALATO
OSSERVATORIO PLACIDO RIZZOTTO FLAI-CGIL - LUGLIO 2018

4th Report on Labor Racketeering,
Placido Rizzotto Observatory

From reports of Ngos and institutions (Eurispes, Placido Rizzotto):

- 400,000 workers (30% of agriculture).
- Most work 12-14 hr per day for 1 euro/hr.
- 62% of seasonal migrants live in ghettos without basic services and water.
- 72% presents diseases they did not have at the start of the employment.

Migrant exploitation in agriculture in Italy

CONDIZIONI DI VITA DEI MIGRANTI STAGIONALI

62% non ha i servizi essenziali

64% non ha l'acqua corrente

72% dopo la raccolta presenta malattie di cui prima non soffriva

FONTE: QUARTO RAPPORTO AGROMAFIE E CAPORALATO
OSSERVATORIO PLACIDO RIZZOTTO FLAI-CGIL – LUGLIO 2018

4th Report on Labor Racketeering,

Placido Rizzotto Observatory

From reports of Ngos and institutions (Eurispes, Placido Rizzotto):

- 400,000 workers (30% of agriculture).
- Most work 12-14 hr per day for 1 euro/hr.
- 62% of seasonal migrants live in ghettos without basic services and water.
- 72% presents diseases they did not have at the start of the employment.
- Migrant protesting the system have been victims of organized crime violence. eg

A multidimensional intervention against exploitation

- Started in 10 cities in 2007 by the Federation of Agricultural Workers.
- Extended to 49 cities across Italy by 2016. Map

A multidimensional intervention against exploitation

- Started in 10 cities in 2007 by the Federation of Agricultural Workers.
- Extended to 49 cities across Italy by 2016. Map

Multidimensional intervention: Pic

1. Information on workers' rights.
2. Legal assistance to report.

A multidimensional intervention against exploitation

- Started in 10 cities in 2007 by the Federation of Agricultural Workers.
- Extended to 49 cities across Italy by 2016. Map

Multidimensional intervention: Pic

1. Information on workers' rights.
2. Legal assistance to report.
3. Incentives: help in applying for a legal residence permit for being victim of exploitation. Ref

Estimation Strategy

Main specification: Exploit staggered roll-out of treatment in a diff-in-diffs design.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_t + \gamma Treat_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

- Treat=1 for cities after they are targeted by the intervention.
- α and β: city and year fixed effects.

Estimation Strategy

Main specification: Exploit staggered roll-out of treatment in a diff-in-diffs design.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_t + \gamma Treat_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

- Treat=1 for cities after they are targeted by the intervention.

- α and β: city and year fixed effects.

  - Order of treatment independent on levels of exploitation. (T)

  - Dropping treated-first does not change conclusions (T)

  - Identifying assumption: (Parallel Trends) and (Treatment Homogeneity).

Estimation Strategy

Main specification: Exploit staggered roll-out of treatment in a diff-in-diffs design.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_t + \gamma Treat_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

- Treat=1 for cities after they are targeted by the intervention.

- α and β: city and year fixed effects.

- Order of treatment independent on levels of exploitation. (T)

- Dropping treated-first does not change conclusions (T)

- Identifying assumption: (Parallel Trends) and (Treatment Homogeneity).

PS Matching and Synth DID Design

Nearest score PS matching and Arkhangelsky et al., 2021 SDID. Improves balance: (T)

Did the intervention increase reporting?

News on labor racketeering in 7 national newspapers of different political slant.

Did the intervention increase reporting?

News on labor racketeering in 7 national newspapers of different political slant.
Validate with province-level measure based on audits by the Labor Inspectorate. Tab

Did the intervention increase reporting?

News on labor racketeering in 7 national newspapers of different political slant.
Validate with province-level measure based on audits by the Labor Inspectorate. (Tab)

▶ Increase by 4 news in 1,000 inhabitants (10-20 fold wrt average).

N=137258
Mean DV:.002

N=1649
Mean DV:.002

Total news   By newspaper   Poisson and Negative Binomial   SDID   Magnitude

Do news talk about migrants reporting?

I read and classify news in treated cities.

- 29%: Migrants denouncing or police operations against labor exploitation;
- 22%: Demonstrations by migrants or by the civil society;
- 22%: Journalistic reports;
- 19%: Policymaking initiatives to fight this phenomenon.

$\Rightarrow$ Increase in news driven by both reporting and civil society activism.

Do news talk about migrants reporting?

I read and classify news in treated cities.

- 29%: Migrants denouncing or police operations against labor exploitation;
- 22%: Demonstrations by migrants or by the civil society;
- 22%: Journalistic reports;
- 19%: Policymaking initiatives to fight this phenomenon.

$\Rightarrow$ Increase in news driven by both reporting and civil society activism.

It is not driven by coverage of the union campaign. Mention of the unions are balanced across treatment and control.

Was it the migrants or the unions?

Possibilities:

- Migrants took costly actions to protest and denounce,
- or the union spoke to the police.

Was it the migrants or the unions?

Possibilities:

- Migrants took costly actions to protest and denounce,
- or the union spoke to the police.

Evidence points to migrants activation:

- News say that migrants' protests lead to the activation of the judiciary. Ex.

Was it the migrants or the unions?

Possibilities:

- Migrants took costly actions to protest and denounce,
- or the union spoke to the police.

Evidence points to migrants activation:

- News say that migrants' protests lead to the activation of the judiciary. (Ex.)

- In fact, ↑ news on "migrant labor racketeering" & "protest" (T)

Was it the migrants or the unions?

Possibilities:

- Migrants took costly actions to protest and denounce,
- or the union spoke to the police.

Evidence points to migrants activation:

- News say that migrants' protests lead to the activation of the judiciary. Ex.

- In fact, ↑ news on "migrant labor racketeering" & "protest" T

- Union pamphlets and interviews say they did not talk to the judiciary.

Was it the migrants or the unions?

Possibilities:

- Migrants took costly actions to protest and denounce,
- or the union spoke to the police.

Evidence points to migrants activation:

- News say that migrants' protests lead to the activation of the judiciary. (Ex.)

- In fact, ↑ news on "migrant labor racketeering" & "protest" (T)

- Union pamphlets and interviews say they did not talk to the judiciary.

- Judiciary would likely not activate in absence of reporting:
  - Hard to prosecute employers if migrants do not testify;

Was it the migrants or the unions?

Possibilities:

- Migrants took costly actions to protest and denounce,
- or the union spoke to the police.

Evidence points to migrants activation:

- News say that migrants' protests lead to the activation of the judiciary. Ex.

- In fact, ↑ news on "migrant labor racketeering" & "protest" T

- Union pamphlets and interviews say they did not talk to the judiciary.

- Judiciary would likely not activate in absence of reporting:
  - Hard to prosecute employers if migrants do not testify;

- Placebo locations where unions collected information on exploitation, but did not lead the intervention with migrants. → Null effect. Placebo DID

Spillovers on Organized Crime Prosecution

Were there spillovers on counter-mafia activity?

Outcome: goods and properties seized to organized crime

Were there spillovers on counter-mafia activity?

Outcome: goods and properties seized to organized crime

▶ Increase of 1.2 or 1.3 more goods seized to organized crime

Poisson and Negative Binomial   Firms seized to mafias   Destined

Natives' Attitudes and Voting

Attitudes towards migrants and voting intentions

Leverage ITANES survey taking place in treated locations before and after treatment. After treatment, the same respondent becomes:

Attitudes towards migrants and voting intentions

Leverage ITANES survey taking place in treated locations before and after treatment. After treatment, the same respondent becomes:

▶ 9% less likely to report anti-immigration sentiments.

Leverage ITANES survey taking place in treated locations before and after treatment. After treatment, the same respondent becomes:

▶ 9% less likely to report anti-immigration sentiments.

▶ 2-3% more likely to vote for far-left. (no clear change in other parties)

▶ Change in voting not driven by change in trust for unions.

beta=-0.03
pval=0.434
N=6357
FE: respondent wave
Mean DV:.45

beta=-0.09
pval=0.046
N=5816
FE: respondent wave
Mean DV:.301

beta=0.03
pval=0.000
N=6412
FE: respondent wave
Mean DV:.093

beta=0.02
pval=0.000
N=6412
FE: respondent wave
Mean DV:.095

Actual voting in national elections at the municipal level

▶ 1% increase in vote share for far-left. Vote Share

Robustness

- Treatment heterogeneity:
  - de Chaisemartin d'Haultfoeuille, Callaway and Sant'Anna, Borusyak et al., Sun and Abraham (N) (P) (V)
  - **Stacked design** (Deshpande and Li, 2020) (N) (P) (V)

- Treatment definition:
  - **Duration of treatment** (Fig)
  - **Drop first years of treatment** (Tab)
  - **Drop one obs at a time** (no simultaneous treatment)

- Size of treated sample:
  - **P-values from Fisher randomization inference.** (Tab)
  - **Conley and Taber 2011 confidence intervals.** (Tab)

- Multiple hypothesis testing. (Tab)
- Compare only within-treated units for voting. (Compare within treated units)

Limitations

- Lack good measure of attacks against migrants.

- Lack of micro-evidence into the mechanisms of political activation.

- How do migrants become engaged with the state, with other migrants, and with civil society?

Next on this topic

Patients treated by the organization

Status in health system

- Collaboration with NGO providing access to basic health services in informal settlements in Puglia.

- Reached $3,300$ patients in 2 years, 55% undocumented.

Next on this topic

Patients treated by the organization

Status in health system

- Collaboration with NGO providing access to basic health services in informal settlements in Puglia.

- Reached 3, 300 patients in 2 years, 55% undocumented.

- Question: Does access to basic health services spur engagement with state institutions and citizens, and improve integration outcomes?

Conclusions

1. Focus on the integration of undocumented migrants.
   - Literature has studied legal migrants or those gaining legal status.
   - → Focus on the conditions under which migrants report exploitation.

Conclusions

1. Focus on the integration of undocumented migrants.
   - Literature has studied legal migrants or those gaining legal status.
   - $\rightarrow$ Focus on the conditions under which migrants report exploitation.

2. Connection between migration and organized crime.
   - Criminals profit by exploiting migrants (Buonanno, Pazzona, 2014; Dipoppa, 2023)
   - $\rightarrow$ Fighting migrants exploitation directly undermines organized crime by reducing their profits and unveiling their activities.

Conclusions

1. Focus on the integration of undocumented migrants.
   - Literature has studied legal migrants or those gaining legal status.
   - $\rightarrow$ Focus on the conditions under which migrants report exploitation.

2. Connection between migration and organized crime.
   - Criminals profit by exploiting migrants (Buonanno, Pazzona, 2014; Dipoppa, 2023)
   - $\rightarrow$ Fighting migrants exploitation directly undermines organized crime by reducing their profits and unveiling their activities.

3. Public opinion literature: who "deserves" integration.
   - Recent studied: vulnerability improves attitudes (Bansak et al., 2016).
   - $\rightarrow$ Effects on behavioral outcomes (voting).

Appendix

Migrant exploitation in agriculture in Italy

Migrants protesting the system were often victims of organized crime violence.

Adnan Siddique, the Pakistani man who was killed on June 3, in a photo provided by his family in Caltanissetta, on June 7 2020 | Photo ANSA/ Photo with kind permission of the Siddique family

MIGRANT WORKERS

Man killed for 'protecting farmworkers from gangmasters'

Migrants protesting against labor racketeering in Rosarno, Calabria, 2010

Back

Adnan Siddique murdered for helping farm-workers denounce their racketeers.

Map of treated areas

Residence permit for humanitarian motives

- Regulated by D.Lgs. 286/1998 in Italy, but existent in other countries.
- Can apply to victims of labor exploitation, sexual exploitation, domestic violence, natural calamity, health reasons, heroic acts.
- The permit is easily released by the *Questore* (province-level chief police).
- Its renewal is subject to the opinion of a specific Commission.
- It allows working and can be converted into permanent.
- Was considerably restricted in 2020.

Back

Sindacato di Strada, picture

Back

Parallel Trends Test: Labor Racketeering News

Back

Parallel Trends Test: Labor Racketeering News, Matching

Back

# Parallel Trends Test: Seized properties

Back

Protests and judicial activation (quotes)

"The strike of North African workers continues for the sixth consecutive day. These migrants, who pick tomatoes in the fields, protest against low wages and illegal hiring practices, and promise to continue to cross their arms until their requests will be met. The DDA (judicial investigative unit) in Lecce has opened an investigation on the exploitation of immigrants in the fields of Nardò. There are several complaints on the part of the workers, including of people who have been threatened with death by the racketeers." *(La Repubblica, August 2011)*.

"The arrests were in the air for months. It made a lot of noise, during the last summer, the fight of the workers in Masseria Boncuri, a shanty town which every June is populated by migrants living the inferno of the farmlands. They bear 10-12 working hours under a scorching sun, paid 20-25 euros at best, below the poverty line. *(Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2012)*

Back

Parallel Trends Test: Destined properties

Back

Parallel Trends Test: Voting

Back

Voting, elections 1 year from treatment

▶ 1.5% increase in vote share for far-left.

Back

Balance before and after matching

	Control Full	Control Matched	Treated	Std. Diff. C Full vs T	Std. Diff. C Match vs T
Variables used for matching					
Employed in agriculture	9.146	21.005	18.598	0.643	-0.126
	(8.543)	(14.797)	(11.968)		
Employed Unskilled	18.440	24.120	23.483	0.434	-0.045
	(7.424)	(11.135)	(8.930)		
Unemployed	10.122	17.474	18.290	0.928	0.074
	(6.402)	(9.232)	(6.034)		
Foreign population	577.392	346.305	311.535	-0.529	-0.079
	(421.238)	(341.301)	(274.195)		
Union members per capita 2006	0.023	0.039	0.049	0.820	0.202
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.021)		
Analphabetism	1.199	2.798	2.620	0.693	-0.071
	(1.438)	(2.030)	(1.464)		
Population density	294.815	463.298	628.899	0.204	0.091
	(623.802)	(1,004.129)	(1,512.872)		
Population	7,089.962	62,149.770	47,751.035	0.282	-0.037
	(38,030.262)	(366805.219)	(139280.156)		
Other covariates					
City Surface	9.973	9.913	9.597	-0.018	-0.014
	(13.441)	(16.645)	(16.049)		
Share males	97.147	96.981	95.426	-0.238	-0.243
	(6.398)	(5.430)	(3.369)		
Share divorced	4.669	3.044	2.832	-0.776	-0.103
	(2.027)	(1.668)	(1.221)		
Foreign pop minors	210.580	184.350	194.798	-0.159	0.109
	(81.522)	(77.505)	(56.915)		
Foreign employment	556.489	538.618	549.891	-0.043	0.069
	(108.161)	(122.112)	(107.622)		
Ratio foreign employed	833.100	733.244	697.427	-0.496	-0.149
	(228.557)	(188.175)	(150.360)		
Ratio foreign unemp	732.187	1,324.199	1,374.661	0.562	0.035
	(599.829)	(1,055.893)	(973.356)		
Observations	136,595	816	833		

Back

News, robustness

	(1) Main specification	(2) First year treated only	(3) Poisson	(4) Neg Binomial
treated	0.0408*	0.0385*	1.307**	1.312*
	(0.0208)	(0.0208)	(0.530)	(0.704)
Observations	137,275	153,425	7,633	7,633
City and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Back

Validation news and audits

	Labor Irregularities in Agriculture (Audits)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Labor Racketeering	5.347***	3.373***	3.397***
(News)	(0.420)	(0.479)	(0.481)
Observations	430	430	430
R-squared	0.314	0.461	0.462
Year fe	Y	Y	Y
Region fe	N	Y	Y
Controls	N	N	Y
Mean DV Control	.051	.051	.051

Back

Correlation order of treatment and levels of exploitation

	Levels exploitation (1=low, 3=high)	
	(1)	(2)
	Within treated	Within treated
Order treatment	0.0806	0.112
(Treated Later)	(0.0654)	(0.0801)
Observations	34	34
R-squared	0.054	0.253
Region fe	No	Yes

Back

Dropping cities treated first

	(1) Drop Treat 2008	(2) Drop Treat 2010	(3) Drop Treat 2011	(4) Drop Treat 2012
treated	0.780**	0.780**	0.393***	0.349***
	(0.359)	(0.359)	(0.136)	(0.134)
Observations	137,156	137,156	137,088	137,071
R-squared	0.296	0.296	0.291	0.291
City and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Back

News, total instead of per capita

	(1)	(2)
	Full sample	Matched sample
treated	0.729***	0.507*
	(0.261)	(0.260)
Observations	137,428	1,649
City and Year FE	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.0121	0.138

Back

News, by newspaper

	(1) Full Corriere	(2) Matched Corriere	(3) Full Repubblica	(4) Matched Repubblica
Treated	0.0187** (0.00946)	0.0107** (0.00445)	0.0221* (0.0120)	0.0172** (0.00783)
Observations	137,275	1,649	137,275	1,649
City and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.0001	0.0002	0.0020	0.0030

Back

Placebo treatment effect on labor racketeering news

	(1) News	(2) News	(3) News	(4) Protests
Treated	0.0406* (0.0209)			0.00660* (0.00396)
Placebo (dummy)		0.00235 (0.00163)		
Placebo (medium)			0.00222 (0.00189)	
Placebo (high)			0.00248 (0.00264)	
Observations	137,258	136,425	136,425	137,258
Municipality-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.00170	0.00170	0.00170	0.000400

Back

Magnitude

- From 2012 to 2014, the union engaged with 21,442 migrant workers.
- (estimated) overall 47,761 migrants were likely reached by the campaign.
- Other intervention to persuade activated 3.4 percent of respondents.
- Assuming even a third of this effect, 4,776 migrants are likely to explain 0.7 more news items per year.

Back

Properties seized to mafias, robustness

	(1) Main specification	(2) First year treated only	(3) Poisson	(4) Negative Binomial
treated	1.331***	0.704**	0.310	0.654***
	(0.471)	(0.353)	(0.312)	(0.171)
Observations	274,890	291,060	52,836	52,836
City and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Back

Firms seized to mafias

	(1) Full	(2) Matched Binomial	(3) Negative Heterog	(4) Treatment
treated	0.115*	-0.0207	0.423*	0.0225
	(0.0609)	(0.129)	(0.253)	(0.0516)
Observations	274,890	3,264	25,976	291,060
City Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Back

Remedy initiatives

Outcome: goods and properties reassigned to public use.

▶ 28-fold increase from the control group mean, 47-fold for agricultural cooperatives.

Vote Share for the Far Left

	(1) Full	(2) Matched	(3) Staggered	(4) Stacked
Treated	0.0121***	0.00470	0.00509	0.00897***
	(0.00326)	(0.00530)	(0.00451)	(0.00258)
Observations	47,397	284	284	55,211
City Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.0539	0.0539	0.0539	0.0500

Back

Voting, accounting for treatment heterogeneity

|	(1) Center-left	(2) Far-left	(3) Center-right	(4) Far-right
treated	-0.0471*	0.597***	-0.0337	-0.0960
	(0.0277)	(0.153)	(0.0224)	(0.291)
Observations	47,787	47,787	47,787	47,787
City Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	-0.0851	0.106	-0.0323	0.838

Back

News, robust to treatment heterogeneity

Properties seized, robust to treatment heterogeneity

Back

Voting, robust to treatment heterogeneity

Back

Voting, relaxing parallel trends

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Center-left	Far-left	Center-right	Far-right
treated	0.0921	0.458***	-0.113**	0.904**
	(0.0555)	(0.136)	(0.0446)	(0.371)
Observations	240	240	240	240
R-squared	0.552	0.497	0.569	0.323
City Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	-0.0647	0.150	-0.00553	0.262

Back

Synthetic DID

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	News	Imm Seized	Vote Far-Left
treated	0.049*	1.258***	0.008**
	(0.029)	(0.465)	(0.003)
N	137258	274720	50421

News   Robustness

Fisher p-value

Table: P-values from Fisher randomization inference

|	News per capita
Standard p-val	0.050
Randomization Inference p-val	0.000
	Properties seized to mafias
Standard p-val	0.005
Randomization Inference p-val	0.003
	Properties destined to public use
Standard p-val	0.047
Randomization Inference p-val	0.001
	Change in vote share for far-left
Standard p-val	0.000
Randomization Inference p-val	0.016

Back

Definition of treatment duration

Figure: Robustness to treatment duration

.48 News

.48 Seized goods

Treatment effect on labor racketeering news, dropping the first years of treatment

	(1) Drop Treat 2008	(2) Drop Treat 2010	(3) Drop Treat 2011	(4) Drop Treat 2012
treated	0.780** (0.359)	0.780** (0.359)	0.393*** (0.136)	0.349*** (0.134)
Observations	137,156	137,156	137,088	137,071
R-squared	0.296	0.296	0.291	0.291
City and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Back

Multiple hypothesis testing

	Standard	FDR sharpened
Labor racketeering news	0.050	0.032
Properties seized to mafia	0.005	0.01
Destined to public use	0.047	0.032
Anti-immigrant attitudes	0.000	0.001
Change in far-left vote	0.045	0.032

Note: Estimates using Anderson 2008 method for multiple hypothesis testing correction.

Back

Conley-Taber 2011 confidence intervals

Table: Conely and Taber 2011 confidence intervals

	News per capita
Standard 95% CI	(-0.0000314 – 0.08167)
Conely-Taber 95% CI	(0.05435597 – 0.07019698)
Conely-Taber 90% CI	(0.07019698 – 0.07019698)
	Properties seized to mafias
Standard 95% CI	(0.4070987 – 2.254182)
Conely-Taber 95% CI	(-0.43416224 – 1.295785)
Conely-Taber 90% CI	(0.40914912 – 1.111675)
	Change in vote share for far-left
Standard coefficient	0.7892663
Standard 95% CI	(0.4637934 – 1.114739)
Conely-Taber coefficient	0.9572773
Conely-Taber 95% CI	(-3.2732553 – 3.055078)
Conely-Taber 90% CI	(-1.3891819 – 2.2283683)

Back